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Abstract 
This article examines introducing Economic Value Added (EVA) as a 
performance measure for wine cooperatives in South Africa to determine 
whether member’s value have been created.  After a thorough explanation and 
calculation of the components of EVA, the EVA of a number of co-operatives 
were calculated and analyzed.  Important trends were identified, conclusions 
drawn and recommendations made from t hese results.  Finally, potential 
improvement opportunities resulting from using EVA as a performance measure 




Financial theorists have long argued that the objective in decision making should 
be to maximize firm value. Managers and practitioners have often criticized them 
for being too single minded about value maximization and for not considering the 
broader aspects of corporate strategy or the interests of other stakeholders. In 
the last decade, however, managers seem to have come around to the view that 
value maximization should be, if not the only, at least the primary objective for 
their firms. This turn-around can be partly attributed to the frustration that many of 
them have felt with strategic consulting and its failures, or partly to an increase in 
their ownership of equity in the firms that they manage. 
 
Cooperatives are regarded as a separate form of business organization, 
extending the conventional classification of single proprietorships, partnerships 
and shareholder owned firms.  Like other firms, cooperatives buy, sell and 
produce goods and services.  However, unlike other firms, cooperatives are 
owned by their members and exist to serve their members, they distribute profits 
or surpluses according to patronage and not according to investment, thus 
creating value.    
 
The search for tools that can put firms a step ahead of the competition never 
ends.  A significant challenge for managers is to distinguish between methods 
that can actually help their firm and those offering no advantage or might actually 
make them worse off.    One such a tool is Economic Value Added (EVA).  The 
question posed in this article is whether wine co-operatives are creating value 
for their members. 
 
 
2.  WHAT IS “VALUE”? 
 
It may be helpful to begin this article by defining its core term.  Value is simply 
the quality/price which is perceived/paid by the customer.  The quality 
component of value includes the inherent quality of the particular product or 
service, as well a s all of its auxiliary features (follow-up service, complaint 
resolution, etc.)  
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From the viewpoint of the customer, the price of the product or service must at 
least be commensurate with — or, ideally, commensurately lower than — the 
perceived value of the product or service received, or else the customer will feel 
that he or she has not received real value from the exchange (Ray, 2001).  In the 
long run, if a firm’s customers perceive that they’re not receiving value, then the 
firm will almost certainly become just another corporate fatality (assuming free 
markets, of course). 
 
3.  EVA DEFINED 
 
EVA is a way of measuring the economic value (profitability) of a business after 
the total cost of capital - both debt and equity - has been taken into account.  
One must remember that most traditional (accounting-based) methods take only 
debt into account.  The calculation of EVA also includes the often considerable 
cost of equity (Firer 1995). 
 
The key principle of EVA is that value is created when the return on an 
investment exceeds the total cost of capital that correctly reflects its investment 
risk.  One can improve EVA (and thus shareholder value) as long as one accepts 
new projects on which the rate of return exceeds the cost thereof.  EVA is an 
internal performance measure of a company's operations on a year-to-year 
basis.  It reflects the successes of the efforts of corporate managers to add value 
to the shareholders' investment.  EVA is the residual income left over from the 
operating profits after the total cost of capital has been subtracted.  A positive 
EVA implies that the rate of return on capital must exceed the required rate of 
return.  To the extent that a company's EVA is greater than zero, the firm is 
creating (adding) value for its shareholders (Stern 1994). 
 
EVA is a measure that properly accounts for all the complex trade-offs involved 
in creating value.  It is computed by taking the spread between the rate of return 
on capital ( ) r  and the cost of capital ( ) c  and then multiply this with the economic 
book value of the capital committed to the business (Stewart 1990): 
  ( )
( ) capital c r EVA






  and   ( )
capital




  where  
      NOPAT   
    = Income attributable to ordinary shareholders   
    + Increase in equity equivalents 
    = ADJUSTED NET INCOME            
    + Preferred dividend        
    + Minority interest provision      
    + Interest payments after tax savings   
  and    
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    Capital 
    = Common equity 
    + Equity equivalents 
    = ADJUSTED COMMON EQUITY 
    + Preferred share capital 
    + Minority interest 
    + Debt 
 
Although there are countless individual actions in a business that employees can 
perform to create value, eventually they all fall in one of the three categories (r, c 
and capital) captured by EVA.  EVA increases when operating efficiency is 
enhanced, when value enhancing investments are undertaken, and when capital 
is withdrawn from unrewarding activities.  To be more specific, EVA increases 
when: 
a)  the rate of return (r) earned on the existing capital base improves; that is, 
the operating margin increases without investing more capital; 
b)  additional capital is invested in projects that earn a rate of return (r) 
greater than the cost of capital (c); and     
c)  capital is liquidated from unrewarding projects (where r < c). 
 
These are the only ways in which shareholder value can be created, and EVA 
captures them all.  
 
4.  RESEARCH METHOD 
 
The research method which was followed to achieve the objective of this 
research, was firstly to obtain the financial statements of all the wine co-
operatives in South Africa from the Registrar of Co-operatives.   Secondly, the 
financial statements were standardized and captured electronically in a 
database.  The next step was to calculate the EVA (with all its components such 
as NOPAT, capital, cost of equity and weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
of each co-operative.  The research method is illustrated below with an example. 
 The selection of the example was random. 
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Table 1:  Extracts from the financial statements of Aan de Doorns 
Winery for the financial years ending 28 February 2000 and 
2001 
Balance sheet for the year ended  2000  2001 
Reserves & undistributed income     
Total own resources     3,912,072     4,144,170 
Total members' sources     2,060,280     2,063,790 
Total members interest     5,972,352     6,207,960 
External LT liabilities     
Total interest-bearings external     3,549,259     4,158,469 
Deferred tax        181,295        400,397 
Total LT liabilities int free        181,295        400,397 
Total LT liabilities     3,730,554     4,558,866 
Total current liabilities     2,270,831     2,508,053 
Total external liabilities     6,001,385     7,066,919 
Total members interest & liab   11,973,737   13,274,879 
     
Fixed assets     
Total LT assets     6,773,831     7,985,670 
Total current assets     5,199,906     5,289,209 
Total assets   11,973,737   13,274,879 
     
Income statement for the year ended  2001   
Net operating income before taking the following into account     2,294,234   
Plus all interest received        209,145   
Adjusted net income     2,503,379   
Income from investments           3,010   
Lease monies                  -   
Depreciation of fixed assets     1,056,666   
Directors remuneration         36,317   
Auditors remuneration         58,922   
Provisions                  -   
Irrecoverable debts written off        270,000   
Interest paid        664,485   
Capital profit/(loss) on the disposal of fixed assets                  -   
Net income/(Loss) before taxation and other items        413,979   
Tax       (219,102)   
Extraordinary items     
Net income/(Loss) for the year (after tax)        194,877   
 
4.1  NOPAT 
 
Economic value added is an accounting-based measure of periodic operating 
performance, and is defined as the difference between accounting earnings and 
the cost of invested capital used to generate those earnings. EVA depends on 
net operating profit after taxes.  To properly calculate economic profit, a variety 
of adjustments must be made to most financial statements. Certain expenditures 
such as research and development and employee training costs are capitalized 
and then amortized rather than expensed (Burkette & Hedley:1997). Other 
adjustments include goodwill and operating leases (Mills, et al.:1998).  Given the 
format of the financial statements of the co-operatives, the calculation of NOPAT  
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for the selected co-operatives is: 
 
( ) ( ) prev tax Def tax Def Tax paid erest loss income Net NOPAT - + - + = 1 * int ) (  
where: 
  tax Deferred tax Def =  
 
NOPAT for Aan De Doorns Winery is: 
( ) ( )
879119
181295 400397 3 . 0 1 * 664485 194877
=
- + - + = NOPAT
 
 
4.2  Capital 
 
The following equation was used to determine capital: 
debt Total equity common Adjusted Capital + =  
 
Adjusted common equity consisted out of the sum of total members interest and 
deferred taxes of the previous year.  Total debt consisted out of the sum of total 
interest bearing external long-term liabilities and total interest bearing current 
liabilities of the previous years.  The previous year was used, because beginning 
amounts must be used in determining EVA. 
 
The capital for Aan De Doorns Wineray is calculated at: 
695 353 10
) 650789 3549259 ( ) 181295 5972352 (
=
+ + + = Capital
 
 
4.3  Cost of equity capital 
 
Accordingly, EVA represents residual income that is left after investors earn their 
required minimum rate of return which compensates them for the risk incurred by 
investing in the company.  This residual approach as stated in Section  4 is: 
( ) capital capital of t return of rate EVA * cos - =  
 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM), with assumptions about no 
transactions cost or private information, concludes that the marginal investor hold 
a portfolio that includes every traded asset in the market, and that the risk of any 
investment is the risk added on to this "market portfolio".  The expected return 
from the model is: 
( ) Rf Rm Rf Rj - + = b  
 Where: 
 
return market Average Rm
Beta
rate free Risk Rf
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The cost of equity capital is the opportunity cost which shareholders forgo by 
investing in a specific company.  While this opportunity cost does not appear in 
any financial statements, Stern Stewart approximates it, based on the CAPM, by 
adding an individual company's adjusted risk premium to the return on long-term 
government bonds.  The adjusted risk premium equals the company's stock beta 
multiplied by 6% (see Stewart, 1991), a long-term risk premium common to 
equities in general (Stewart, 1991; Stern Stewart, 1993).   
The cost of equity capital for Aan De Doorns Winery for 2001 is calculated as: 
( )
% 75 . 15
78 . 10 78 . 16 83 . 0 % 78 . 10
=
- + = Rj
 
  
4.3.1  Risk-free rate 
 
Before the CAPM can be applied, the question of what is the risk-free rate must 
first be answered.  To understand what makes an asset risk free, it is necessary 
to determine how risk is measured in finance. Investors who buys assets have a 
return that they expect to make over the time horizon that they will hold the asset. 
The actual returns that they make over this holding period may by very different 
from the expected returns, and this is where the risk comes in.  Risk in finance is 
viewed in terms of the variance in actual returns around the expected return. For 
an investment to be risk free in this environment, then, the actual returns should 
always be equal to the expected return. 
 
Under what conditions will the actual returns on an investment be equal to the 
expected returns?  A condition necessary is that there can be no default risk.  
Essentially, this rules out any security issued by a private firm, since even the 
largest and safest firms have some measure of default risk.  The only securities 
that have a chance of being risk free are government securities, not because 
governments are better run than companies, but because they control the printing 
of currency. At least in nominal terms, they should be able to fulfill their promises. 
 Even this assumption, straightforward though it might seem, does not always 
hold up, especially when governments refuse to honor claims made by previous 
regimes and when they borrow in currencies other than their own.  In this study, 
the average return on the R150 is used as the risk-free rate.  Table 2 indicates 
the return on the R150 for the period from 1997 to 2001. 
 
 
Table 2:  Average return of R150 for the period from 1997 to 2001 
1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
14.57%  15.03%  14.49%  13.17%  10.78% 
 
4.3.2  Beta 
 
The last input in the CAPM is the beta.  The beta or betas that measure risk in 
models of risk in finance have two basic characteristics that need to keep in 
mind during estimation.  The first is that they measure the risk added on to a 
diversified portfolio, rather than total risk.  Thus, it is entirely possible for an 
investment to be high risk, in terms of individual risk, but to be low risk, in terms  
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of market risk.  The second characteristic that all betas share is that they 
measure the relative risk of an asset, and thus are standardized around one.  
The market-capitalization weighted average beta across all investments, in the 
CAPM, should be equal to one.  In any multi-factor model, each beta should have 
the same property.  The average betas, over a 5-year period, of the selected 
companies were used in the CAPM to determine the expected return.  The 
companies were chosen on principle of their main activities.  The selected 
companies were:  Afgri, Distell, KWV-Bel, Omnia, Rainbow, SAPPI and 
Tigerbrands. 
   
Table 3 indicates the betas used in determining the costs of capital for the 
period from 1998 to 2001. 
 
Table 3:  Average beta used for the period from 1998 to 2001 
1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
0.65  0.66  0.78  0.85  0.83 
 
4.4  Cost of debt 
 
To determine the cost of debt, the return on the R150 was used and a risk 
premium of 2% was added.  The cost of debt must be after tax, to take the tax 
benefit of debt into consideration.   
 
The cost of debt for Aan De Doorns Winery for 2001 was calculated as: 
% 94 . 8
) 3 . 0 1 %)( 2 % 78 . 10 (
) 1 )( 2 (
=
- + =
- + = Tax Rf id
 
where: 
  debt of t tax after id cos =  
 
4.5  Weighted average cost of capital 
 
The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) was used in determining the cost 
of capital.  The weighted average cost of capital can be defined as: 
) / ( * ) / ( * A D id A E Rj WACC + =  
Where: 
E  =  adjusted common equity 
A  =  assets 
D  =  debt 
 
The WACC for Aan De Doorns Winery for 2001 was calculated as: 
% 99 . 12
10353695
4200048
* 3 . 0 1 2 78 . 10
10353695
6153647















The WACC of the co-operatives reflects their unique composition between debt 
and equity, thus reflecting the risk of the cooperative.  An advantage of using  
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EVA as a financial performance measure is that it takes into account the 
company's total cost of capital.   
 













￿ - = EVA
 
 
5.  RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
Seven co-operatives were randomly selected to discuss the EVA-results in 
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Table 4:  EVA calculation of 7 selected co-operatives for the period 
1998 to 2001 
Co-op  Year  NOPAT  Capt  Return  WACC  Spread  EVA 
Agterkliphoogte  1998      191,425     2,249,100  8.5  16.5  -8.0    (179,279) 
  1999      156,711     2,296,727  6.8  17.0  -10.2    (233,965) 
  2000        19,017     2,415,541  0.8  16.2  -15.4    (371,509) 
  2001      184,086     2,671,236  6.9  13.4  -6.5    (172,687) 
Badsberg  1998      339,404     5,641,457  6.0  16.0  -10.0    (562,292) 
  1999      485,001     6,797,409  7.1  15.6  -8.4    (573,013) 
  2000      463,481     6,418,551  7.2  14.8  -7.5    (484,436) 
  2001      572,739     7,812,535  7.3  12.0  -4.6    (362,805) 
Barrydale  1998      444,638     3,029,292  14.7  15.0  -0.3      (10,602) 
  1999     (213,288)     5,148,568  -4.1  13.8  -18.0    (924,591) 
  2000      191,795     4,913,393  3.9  12.1  -8.2    (402,455) 
  2001      535,561     4,439,763  12.1  10.1  1.9       86,519 
Citrusdal  1998      392,467     8,263,821  4.7  16.9  -12.1  (1,003,649) 
  1999      355,894   12,714,809  2.8  15.7  -12.9  (1,637,155) 
  2000   3,346,959   15,693,623  21.3  14.2  7.1   1,116,031 
  2001   2,987,721   19,802,316  15.1  11.9  3.2     633,378 
Perdeberg  1998   1,096,830     5,658,112  19.4  15.9  3.5     198,202 
  1999   1,379,548     6,559,484  21.0  16.0  5.1     332,413 
  2000   4,854,874     4,430,484  109.6  13.5  96.1   4,257,464 
  2001   5,023,152   27,197,480  18.5  10.4  8.0   2,187,529 
Robertson  1998   2,846,005   27,408,688  10.4  15.0  -4.6  (1,267,121) 
  1999      341,319   26,071,958  1.3  15.6  -14.3  (3,720,630) 
  2000   1,598,275   28,570,232  5.6  15.0  -9.4  (2,675,237) 
  2001   1,004,042   37,265,347  2.7  12.6  -9.9  (3,686,064) 
Spruitdrift  1998   1,756,337   13,727,786  12.8  13.3  -0.5      (65,664) 
  1999   2,664,039   19,336,668  13.8  12.7  1.1     205,338 
  2000   2,387,933   24,540,542  9.7  11.6  -1.9    (466,491) 
  2001   2,491,378   24,993,419  10.0  9.9  0.1       17,638 
 
As one can see from the EVA from Agterkliphoogte Co-operative, the negative 
Eva values occur during each of the four years under review.  During 2000 the 
highest negative value of R371,509 occurs, whilst the lowest negative value 
(R172,687) was achieved in 2001.  With the formula of EVA in mind ((r  – 
WACC) x capital)), a positive sign over the four year period for this Co-operative 
is the fact that the WACC has decreased from 17.01% in 1999 to 13.36% in 
2001.  In addition, the rate of return (r) has increased from 6.82% in 1999 to 
6.89% in 2001.  This means that the spread is still negative, but is becoming 
smaller. 
 
The EVA results of the Badsberg Co-operative were negative for the four years 
under review.  However, the negative EVAs are becoming smaller from 1999 
(R562,292) to 2001 (R362,805).  This improvement resulted from the continuous 
increasing in the return (from 6.02% in 1998 to 7.33% in 2001) as well as the 
decreasing of the WACC (from 15.98% in 1998 to 11.97% in 2001).  Although  
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the spread is still negative, it is becoming smaller.  The improvement in EVA of 
this Co-operative is even more remarkable if one take into account that it has 
been achieved with an increased amount of capital employed over the four year 
period. 
 
The Barrydale Co-operative has improved their EVA from negative R924,591 in 
1999 to positive R86,520 in 2001.  Whilst the rate of return has improved from 
negative 4.14% in 1999 to 12.06% in 2001, the WACC has decline from 13.82% 
to 10.11% over the same period, thereby creating the first positive spread during 
2001.  NOPAT over this period has improved and capital employed has 
remained constant.  One can see that this Co-operative is now in the position to 
invest more capital and become a constant value creator.  
 
The EVA of Citrusdal Co-operative improved from negative R1,637,155 in 1999 
to positive R633, 378 in 2001.  This is a good example of a value destroyer that 
has become a value creator.  The reason for this improvement lies in the 
increasing of the rate of return from 4.75% in 1998 to 15.09% in 2001, as well as 
in the declining of WACC from 16.89% in 1998 to 11.89% in 2001.  This means 
that a positive spread has been achieved and thereafter the correct action 
appears to have been undertaken:  Increase capital employed.  With the positive 
spread, capital has been increased from R8,263,821 in 1998 to R19,802,316 in 
2001.   
 
Perdeberg Co-operative is an example of a consistent value creator.  A positive 
and increasing EVA has been achieved over the four year period.  EVA 
improved from R198,202 in 1998 to R2,187,529 in 2001.  Whilst the rate of 
return has remained constant at around 18% during this period, WACC has 
declined from 15,88% in 1998 to 10.43% in 2001.  The WACC of 10.43% is 
amongst the lowest of the whole sample of 37 Co-operatives.  The consistent 
positive spread has caused the increase in EVA together with an increase in 
capital employed over the four year period. 
 
Robertson Co-operative is an example of a consistent value destroyer.  A 
negative EVA has been achieved over the four year period.  EVA decreased 
from negative R1,267,121 in 1998 to negative R3,686,064 in 2001.  Whilst the 
rate of return has declined from 10.38% in 1998 to only 2.69% in 2001, WACC 
has declined from 15,01% in 1998 to 12.59% in 2001.  This means that a 
negative spread has been achieved.  This value destruction situation has been 
worsened by the fact that in addition to a negative spread of around 10% for 
2000 and 2001, an ever increasing amount of capital has been  employed.  
Capital employed increased from R27,408,688 in 1998 to R37,265,347 in 2001. 
 This amount of capital employed is amongst the highest of the total sample of  
37 Co-operatives. 
 
The EVA created by Sruitdrif Co-operation is an example of mixed results over 
the four year period.  The EVA varied from negative R466,491 in 2000 to 
positive R205,338 in 1999.  What is also interesting about this Co-operative is 
the very small spread.  From 1998 to 2001 it appears that both the return and the 
WACC has decreased.  The Co-operative however is producing a very  
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consistent and relatively high NOPAT throughout the four year period.  In addition 
to that, capital employed is not only at a high level, but has been increasing as 
well.  Is seems that a small increase in the rate of return or a small decrease in 
WACC will definitely bring about a large value creating opportunity.  
 
Table 5 looks at the EVA-performance of all the wine co-operatives as an 
industry. 
 
Table 5:  EVA for all the wine cooperatives for the period from 1998 
    to 2001. 
    1998  1999  2000  2001 
EVA  Total      (6,623,035)    (44,024,292)    (19,892,992)    (15,657,220) 
 Average        (200,698)      (1,222,897)        (552,583)        (434,923) 
NOPAT  Total     43,075,963      21,362,911      34,820,170      28,248,962  
 Average       1,305,332          593,414          967,227          784,693  
Captal  Total   318,772,524    428,276,370    372,307,226    409,063,147  
 Average       9,659,773      11,896,566      10,341,867      11,362,865  
Equity  Total   165,675,762    208,390,704    198,459,584    186,418,027  
 Average       5,020,478        5,788,631        5,512,766        5,178,279  
Debt  Total   153,096,762    219,885,666    173,847,642    222,645,120  
 Average       4,639,296        6,107,935        4,829,101        6,184,587  
Return  Average  13.74  7.05  10.70  7.18 
WACC  Average  15.37  15.25  14.52  12.12 
Spread  Average  -1.63  -8.20  -3.82  -4.94 
 
The total EVA in each of the four years under review has negative values.  There 
are however an improvement in the trend, because from 1999 to 2000 EVA has 
declined from negative R44,024,292 to negative R15,657,220.  During the same 
period NOPAT has increased from R21,362,911 to R28,248,962.  This is a very 
positive sign and can be one of the reasons for the improvement in EVA. 
 
Capital, equity  and debt show interesting changes over the four year period.  
Whilst there was a steady increase in the total capital employed from 
R318, 772,542 in 1998 to R409,063,147 in 2001, the mix or ratio between 
equity and debt changed over this period.  Equity declined steadily from 
R208,390,704 in 1999 to R186,418,027 in 2001.  Debt, on the other hand, 
showed an increase in value and the highest level of R222,645,120 is reached in 
2001.  Debt as a ratio to total capital has increased from 48% in 1998 to 54% in 
2001.  This is an indication that debt as financing alternative has become more 
preferable, possibly due to the declining interest rates during the period under 
review. 
 
The rate of return is a cause of concern as it has declined from 13.74% in 1998 
to 7.18% in 2001.  As the rate of return is central in the value creating process 
and calculation thereof, this decline is another explanation of the negative EVA 
values that has been achieved over the period.  What is also alarming is that the 
decline in the rate of return has occurred despite an increase in the value of 
NOPAT over the four year period.  The profit margins and cost structures of the 
cooperatives must therefore be the subject of intense scrutiny by management.     
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WACC has declined over the four year period from 15.37% in 1998 to 12.12% in 
2001.  This means that it has from the cost of capital point of view, become more 
easy to be in a position to render a positive spread.  The reason for the decline 
in WACC is firstly due to the fact that debt (which is arguably the least expensive 
after-tax source of capital to the firm) has become a bigger portion of total 
capital and therefore has reduce the WACC of the co-operatives.  Secondly, the 
component cost of debt itself has declined over the four year period. 
 
The spread is the difference between the rate of return (r) and WACC.  A 
positive spread (r greater than WACC) will imply a value creating situation whilst 
a negative spread will be a value destruction situation.  As can be observed from 
table 5, the spread is negative in each of the four years under review.  This 
situation occurred despite a constant decline in WACC which highlights once 
again the fact that the rate of return is arguably the main problem area or 
stumbling block that prevents the cooperatives from being in a value creating 
situation.  
 
From the above analysis certain recommendations will be made in the next 
section. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The shareholder of any enterprise wants to know whether value is being created 
or destroyed by the management of that enterprise.  Whilst there are many ways 
in which “value” can be expressed, the so-called “economic” methods take not 
only the total cost of capital into account, but also the amount of capital needed 
to generate the accompanying profit.   
 
In this study EVA has been identified as the method to express the value created 
or destroyed by the management of wine co-operatives.  After a thorough 
explanation and calculation of the components of EVA, the EVA of a number of 
co-operatives were calculated and analysed.  Important trends can be identified, 
conclusions drawn and recommendations made from these results. 
 
It was illustrated that of the 36 co-operatives the minority created value as 
expressed by a positive EVA.  By far the majority destroyed value which result in 
a negative EVA.  In addition, this situation in many occasions occurred for a 
number of years in succession.   
 
It was evident from the data that over the four year period under review that 
WACC declined consistently (this was partly due to declining interest rates over 
the period as well as an increased usage of cheaper debt in the capital 
structure).  Whilst this was a positive factor in the value creation process, it was 
virtually nullified by the fact that the rate of return declined which result in a 
negative spread.  In addition, more capital was committed to the enterprises.  
This was naturally a recipe for value destruction to take place. 
 
From these results it can be recommended that in the first place a co-operative  
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must determine its position in terms of value creation and destruction – does it 
have a positive or a negative EVA?  From this position it is clear what to do to 
improve the EVA:   
 
a)  Increase the rate of return by improving the operating margins under 
which the specific co-operative operates.  This will include a thorough 
analysis of operating activities as well as an analysis of the markets within 
which the co-operative operates and the products which it sell; 
b)   decrease WACC, firstly by obtaining financing at as low as possible 
rates and secondly, by structuring the capital base of the co-operative in 
such a way as to take into account the fact that debt is the cheapest form 
of financing;  
c)  invest in project that renders a rate of return greater than WACC; 
d)  liquidate capital from projects where the cost (WACC) is greater than the 
return thereon. 
 
As a value-based management system, EVA includes measures to gauge 
financial performance, evaluate strategic, plans and acquisition candidates, 
identify unprofitable product lines, and increase working capital focus. The 
system is designed to focus on key value drivers and the cost of capital, while 
establishing a basis for incentive compensation and communications within the 
firm and with the investment community. 
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